<p>In 1967, Korea officially acceded to the GATT as the 71st Contracting Party in the final phase of the Kennedy Round. For a poor country pursuing an export-oriented development<br />
strategy, the GATT membership was critical to Korea because it could secure most-favorednation (MFN) status with all 66 GATT Contracting Parties. Earlier, Korea concluded bilateral trade agreements with only a handful of countries such as the United States (1956), Philippines<br />
(1961), Taiwan (1961) and Thailand (1961). As exports grew, more trade agreements were negotiated.</p>
<p>While this was a time-consuming and cumbersome procedure, securing GATT membership was a once-and-for-all solution to bypass negotiating endless bilateral agreements by gaining the MFN status in overseas markets. The GATT membership was also perceived by the Korean policy makers as an opportunity for cooperating with other developing countries. This allows to combat discrimination and protectionism against export items of interest to<br />
Korea, particularly in the agricultural and cotton textile sectors.</p>
<p>As a new member, Korea did not have to pursue market liberalization first, which was a requirement to GATT membership; instead, Korea could delay liberalization by invoking Article XVIII:B, which allowed import restrictions for developing countries with balance of payment (BOP) problems.</p>
<p>Facing global and domestic challenges, Korea took the way of further liberalization by actively promoting free trade agreements, and the government believed this would contribute to Korea’s continuing economic growth. Pursuing FTAs for the past decade, the Korean government learned through trial and error. Sometimes, pursuing FTA brough significant social costs, but it also provided a chance for the country to set up its own strategies, re-organize its institutions and modify related laws through its FTA policy.</p>