<p>Like other Asian countries, the Philippines is involved in bilateral and regional trade negotiations because WTO trade talks have gone in to a crawl. The Philippines is part of the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) and APEC; it signed on the Early Harvest Program for the China-ASEAN FTA; and it has concluded bilateral negotiations with Japan, the results of which are now under review. Even as it maintains commitment to multilateral discussions, it is also considering bilateral negotiations with the US, Australia, Korea, and India and, perhaps, with more countries in the future. With the potential increase in the number of international negotiations, it is appropriate to ask whether the Philippines has adequate resources and capacity to enter into all these trade discussions, and more pointedly, whether we have adequate government structures that can effectively deal with presumably prepared and structurally organised foreign counterparts.</p>
<p>The paper describes the current decisi on-making structure for trade policy formulation in the Philippines and compares it with the systems in selected countries. It cites difficulties in the current set-up, such as :</p>
<ul>
<li>turf mentality among government agencies that tend to paralyse inter-agency committees in coming up with an overall position that fully acknowledges trade-offs</li>
<li>lack of appreciation of and capacity for trade research that should inform negotiating positions</li>
<li>unclear de lineation of authority</li>
<li>lack of suitable mechanisms for consultation and feedback on negotiation progress and impact, not only regarding tariffs but also of other items under discussion.</li>
</ul>
<p>This paper argues that there is need for a single agency that will handle all international trade negotiations, coordinate e ffectively with other government departments and agencies, and formulate final trade positions for negotiations.</p>
<p>It proposes either:</p>
<ul>
<li>the creation of an independent agency for trade negotiation, some thing akin to the US Trade Representative Office; or, considering fiscal realities in the short-run</li>
<li>at least, the strengthening of the existing Bureau of International Trade Relations (BITR) position within the Tariff and Related Matters (TRM) Committee structure.</li>
</ul>
<p>A stronger, centralized body, principally or primarily in charge of trad e policy negotiations would be able to curb the turf battles among different agencies, or, at a minimum, prevent them from stalling the realization of trade mandates for negotiators.</p>
<p>The paper also stresses the crucial role of trade research in supporting negotiations and suggests ways to strengthen capacity in this area.</p>