<p>The relationships between Members of Parliament (MPs) and voters in developing countries are often characterised by clientelistic exchanges of tangible goods and votes. In Tanzania, clientelism has been prominent in MP-voter relationships since the transit ion to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. It was enhanced in part by the legalisation of election incentives given by politicians to voters between 2000 and 2006. Against this unique background, this paper examines the way in which election incentive s and electoral clientelism affected public views on MPs.</p>
<p>Drawing on Afrobarometer survey data for 2005, 2008, and 2012 as well as data on electoral competitiveness and MPs’ engagement with parliamentary discussions, this examination reveals a shifting trend in public expectations and evaluations of MPs: Tanzanian voters increasingly favoured programmatic MPs rather than clientelistic MPs. Moreover, Tanzanians who had been offered election incentives in 2010 and preferred clientelistic MPs were more likely to disapprove of the performance of MPs. These results suggest that clientelism does not necessarily help Tanzanian MPs to maintain long-term electoral support.</p>