<p>China’s impressive economic growth and increasing development activities overseas, particularly in the African continent, have spurred intense debate and criticism over its role as a rising power in international development. China is viewed in the West both as a threat, but also as a valuable potential partner in development cooperation. However, differences between Western and Chinese conceptions of foreign aid and development have complicated cooperation and understanding of China’s development and aid structures. Further knowledge of these differences is needed, in order to evaluate their implications for low-income countries, and for potential trilateral cooperation.</p>
<p>Policy implications:</p>
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<li>China is now frequently referred to as the emerging superpower of the twentyfirst century. On the basis of sustained and substantial economic growth over quarter of a century, China’s national power and regional and global standing has been transformed. As an increasingly significant global player, the second largest economy with burgeoning foreign exchange reserves, and possibly the largest contributor to global warming, increasingly scholars are focused on the implications of what its ‘peaceful rise’ means for the international competitiveness of other countries’ manufactures; for financial and exchange rate stability; for military security; and for global public goods and international development cooperation</li>
<li>China’s approach to aid significantly differs from that of Western donors and is still evolving, and awareness of differences in ideologies behind aid and development remains key to future successful aid cooperation. China does not wish to be regarded as a donor; its conceptions of its development cooperation and rejection of a donor identity must be respected when building engagement and cooperation bilaterally or in global forums</li>
<li>though non-interference is a central principle of China’s foreign aid policies, its growing involvement and investments in high-risk parts of sub-Saharan Africa mean this may be increasingly difficult to sustain. Increased political engagement and investment in security may be a necessary spillover in China’s engagement in Africa</li>
<li>the institutional context of China’s development cooperation is complex, and Western donors and external partners must take these differentiated political roles into consideration in order to effectively pursue trilateral development cooperation. The Chinese state and the DAFC in particular still has very limited capacity in coordinating between the multitude of actors operating in this environment. As China’s development assistance commitments grow, the institutional capacity and responsibility of this nascent agency will also need to be developed</li>
<li>prospects for trilateral cooperation remain viable, particularly in forums like the G20 which has adopted shared growth and development as a part of its core agenda. China has also taken steps toward avenues for cooperation, and the creation of EBIEC, a division under the DAFC to manage international cooperation, shows it is willing to learn from, and amenable to cooperation with, traditional donors. However, in initiating trilateral cooperation, recipient countries must be central in leading and participating in discussions around trilateral cooperation between Western countries and China</li>
<li>the business sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are an increasingly salient presence in China’s development cooperation, in Africa and elsewhere. The growing diversity and multitude of Chinese firms now operating in Africa presents a challenge for state coordination, and in mediating China’s sometimes controversial public image abroad. Though incentivised by the state, business actors also act autonomously from state directives, and this must be recognised when liaising with Chinese business or state actors. Conflicts between state aims and business goals may be an emerging tension as China’s development activities evolve, leading to a potential gap between policy and practice</li>
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